Introduction
Probabilistic reasoning is often rather loosely referred to as being non-monotonic. But how can we make this notion of non-monotonicity precise? In par ticular, what sort of non-monotonicity characterizes probabilistic reasoning? We will be addressing both of these questions in this paper. Our approach is to use the same defi nition of non-monotonicity as for categorical reasoning. This requires that we cast probabilistic reasoning in terms of categorical reason ing, i.e. reasoning where each sentence may only take on a truth value of 0 or 1.
Probabilistic Logic
A way to do so is provided by the approach of "Probabilistic Logic", as introduced in [15] and extended in [3] .
Suppose we start with a. (finite) set A of statements about the probabilities of some sentences S; in a (categorical) logical language L+ The basic idea of Probabilistic Logic is to express the probabilistic statements A in a second logical language C.m which The logical properties of C.b (e.g. its tautologies) are encoded as a set of axioms LOG b in Lm. We can represent an assertion Gin Lb by an axiom P(G) = 1 in C.m which says it holds with certainty. For example we can write as an axiom in LOGb:
'v'XY. P((X 1\ (X-Y))-.Y)) = 1
There is a subtlety, however, that eases the job of writing LOGb. The only formulas of Lb that we need to describe in l:.m are those formed (by application of logical connectives) from the members of the set :F of interpretation classes of S = { Si} . Then we do not need to encode in LOGb all the tautologies of Lb, only those of propositional logic involving propositions corresponding to the space W = 2F. See [15] for details.
The definitional axioms of standard probability AXPROB, are also encoded in l:.m, e.g. 1 Thus by recourse to a meta-language, probabilistic knowledge and reasoning can be described in terms of categorical logic and reasoning.
P(True)
Disclaimer: There are some kinds of probabilistic reasoning, notably with "higher-order" probabilities, which cannot. be straightforwardly formulated in the above way. That is, we have ass umed that A contains statements in which there is only one level of nesting 1cf. [5] , modified so that the probability function is defined on propositions rather than sets of {probability of ... } before reaching a proposition in a categorical language. However, one could apply our approach iteratively to express some sorts of second-order or higher-order probabilistic theories.
Above, we assumed Cb was zero-th order in P. Then Cm was first-order in P. However, more generally, we could let Cb be of order n in P, and then Cm would be of order n + 1. Probabilistic Logic allows us to consider A to be a set of statements in Cm. Suppose we have some rule for generating the set of conclusions (in Cm) that we draw from A. We can then ask whether the set of conclusions grows monotonic ally as we add to A. We call this conclusion drawing set operation theory-closure. Th8 above is an example of a theory-closure operator. Logical (non-)monotonicity is (non-)monotonicity of theory closure. If T is (non-)monotonic, we say that T(B) is a (non-)monotonic theory.
We also · call a defeasible conclusion a non-monotonic conclusion. A monotonic conclusion is one which is not defeasible. Thus we can partition any theory T(B) into a monotonic part and a non-monotonic part. We will say that reasoning (inference) is mono tonic or non-monotonic according to whether the con clusions drawn are monotonic or non-monotonic. We write I= T for entailment of a monotonic conclusion, and � T for entailment of a non-monotonic conlusion.
Note that when T(A) is of Type-l-ei form, logical monotonicity corresponds to the functional mono tonicity of the equivalent p-(WIW). In other words, if when we add new probabilistic statments to A, the lower bound of every probability does not decrease, then the update is monotonic. If this condition is violated, then the update is non-monotonic.
Probabilistic Logic as defined in [15, 3] draws its notions of logical implication and entailment from class ical categorical logic, in fact implicitly from first order logic. It is thus monotonic, since first-order logic is.
However, just as class ical logic can be extended to perform non-monotonic reasoning, so can Proba bilistic Logic. Thus we can represent non-monotonic probabilistic reasoning via non-m � notonic categorical reasoning in Cm. To do so will require us to adopt theory-closure operators different from Th8, since Th8 is monotonic. However,· we might want to include Th8 in the monotonic part of whatever non monotonic T we employ. Later when we define a cir cumscriptive approach to one kind of non-monotonic probabilistic reasoning, we will do just that. We will call the monotonic sentences (e.g. Th8(A)) hard information (beliefs). Relatively speaking, the non monotonic conclusions are soft, i.e. tentative.
Non-monotonic probabilistic reasoning requires us to employ principles fo r drawing conclusions which properly extend (i.e. go beyond) the axioms of clas sical probability. Thus each of the types of non monotonic probabilistic reasoning discussed below takes the axioms of a classical probability as a con straining point of departure rather than as an equiv alent model.
A Monotonic Example
As an example of monotonic probabilistic reasoning using Th8 as our theory-closure operator, consider the case of a rather rowdy fellow named Igor. Let If we next learn (i.e. add to At to get A2)
then we can infer
which is consistent with, but stronger than, (1). The conclusions (1) and (2) are forced or determined by the given information in a strong sense which depends only on the standard axioms and definitions of classical probability. However, a commonly-found pattern of probabilis tic reasoning is to presume in this circumstance that
P(LI(N /\ T)) = P(LIN)
A variety of rationales might be offered. One is that as long as we have no information to the contrary, the best estimate of the proportion of lemons in the class of Neptune Tritons is to use the information we are given about the proportion of lemons in the overall class of Neptunes. Another rationale is that since we have no evidence that the property of being a Triton model is indeed relevant to whether Neptunes are lemons, we will presume it is irrelevant.
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In effect, .
is adopted as a default. We are using a non monotonic theory-closure operator T to generate a non-monotonic conclusion:
Suppose next we learn (i.e. add to At to form A2)
05 (4) i.e. we get definitive, hard information about the value of P(LI(N /\ T)). (4) contradicts and overrides our previous non-monotonic conclusion (3): it is a non-monotonic update. If next we are asked what is P(LI(N /\ T /\ W)), where W means that the car is a station-wagon, our circumstance is similar to that above. Again, Th8 tells us nothing: only that P(LI(N /\ T /\ W)) may consistently take on any value between 0 and 1. Later, as we did in (4), we may get specific, hard information. In the meanwhile, we might apply the same sort of non monotonic reasoning as we performed before to get (3). This time there is an added complexity, though. We have two different pieces of hard information bearing on the probability of L: both are conditioned on classes which are more general than (N /\T /\ W)).
Often a refi nement to the above rationales is invoked: in cases of such competition, we choose to adopt the "most specific" information, i.e. the one which is conditional on the most specific class. So in the choice between P(HI(N /\ T /\ W)) = P(HIN); and (5) P(HI(N /\ T /\ W)) = P(Hj(N /\ T)) (6) we favor the latter. Thus we infer AaF:: r{P(LI(N /\ T /\ W)) = .05}
Similarly, if we are asked about the probability of L for progressively more specific classes (e.g. by adding blue, air-conditioned, etc. as further conditions), we might employ the same pattern of non-monotonic reasoning to conclude from A2 that:
05, P(LI(N /\ T /\ W /\Blue/\ AirCond)) = .05, ...
Default Inheritance of Probabilities
Our non-monotonic example above illustrates what appears to be one commonly-found type of non monotonic probabilistic reasoning. Now we will formulate the example more abstractly.
A2 consisted exactly of: P(HIC1) = P(HIC2) = while LOGb contained:
In our example, we inherited a defeasible (default) value for the probability of H for the conditioning class s from the most specific conditioning class ci for which we had a hard value for the probability of H.
The "Default Inheritance" Principle:
Let P(HIS) denote the probability of some hypothesis H of interest, given the situation S at hand. Suppose our hard information A consists only of values for the probability of H, conditional on various propositions Ci which form a chain. Then in order to conclude a defeasible value for P(HIS), we look for the most specific C; such that s-C;, and make P(HIS) equal to P(HIC;).
The structure of this sort of non-monotonic rea soning is analogous to that of default inheritance in categorical reasoning, e.g. in the classic exa � ple � f whether birds and ostriches fly. In default mherl tance, a particular class S inherits an attribute A from the most specific class C; of a chain of S's super classes { Ci} for which information about A is avail able. In the categorical case of default inheritance, the attribute is inherited with certainty, e.g. Flies or else -.Flies. We can represent this as inheriting either P(A ) = 0 or else P(A) = 1 2 . The "default inheritance" type of non-monotonic reasoning with probabilities corresponds to inheriting the probability P(A) of the attribute, which is not always 0 or 1.
2We have considered here only binary attributes, but the property of certainty holds for n-ary attributes as well
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Thus it can be formalized as a generalization of the usual default inheritance. Alternatively, we can think of it as inheriting with certainty an attribute which is a probability, e.g. P(H) above.
5 Specificity-Prioritized Maximization of Conditional Independence
We can formulate our non-monotonic example in terms of (non-monotonically inferred) conditional independence statements. Let C I G( { x, y}, z )3 mean that the propositions x and y are conditionally independent given the proposition z, i.e. that:
which is equivalent {when P(xiz) ::/: 0) to:
P(xj( y 1\ z)) = P(xlz)
; and (when P(yjz) ::/: 0) to: P(yj(x 1\ z)) = P(y jz) Since P((S-Ci)) = 1 for i = 1, 2 :
Thus (5) is equivalent to:
P(HI(S 1\ Cl)) = P(HIC1); i.e., CIG({H, S},C1).
Similarly, (6) is equivalent to:
P(HI(S 1\ C2)) = P(HIC2); i.e., GIG( {H, S}, C2)
Note that after (4), because P(HIC2) differs from P(HIC1), CIG({H,S},C2) and CIG({H,S},C1) cannot hold simultaneously. In effect, we have a competition and conflict between the two. According to the "default inheritance" principle, we try to non monotonically conclude at least one of the two, and GIG( {H, S}, C2) takes precedence when (as after (4), though not before (4)) there is conflict. Thus we can formulate the precedence of more specific information as a priority among default conditional independence statements.
We propose formulating the "default inheritance" principle as the Specifi city-Prioritized Maximiza tion of Conditional Independence (SPMCI). That is, given some hard probabilistic axioms, we non monotonically conclude conditional independence statements corresponding to inheritance chains. (If such conditional independence statements are incon sistent with the given hard axioms, then as usual with 3Here {x,y} is a set not a tuple, since CIG({x,y},z) is symmetric in x -y. It is also useful to d � �e the c . �e of mutual independence among a set of n propos1t1ons conditional on z, but we will not take the space here. An important (and open) question is which con ditional independence statements to maximize. We may only want to apply the "default inheritance" principle to some hypotheses Hk and some chains Cf and situations sm. If we are only interested in inheriting a default value the way we did above for the probability of a particular H conditional on a particular S, then it appears we need consider only GIG tuples ( {u, v }, w} such that H or ...., fl is in {u, v} and P(S-w) = 1. effect combined (rather implicitly) with the "default inheritance" principle to yield non-monotonically a value for P(HIS), when (S is the situation at hand and) we believe with certainty that:
and when S implies no other Ej's for which P(HIEj) is available. This step corresponds to an application of SPMCI; more specific conjunctions of the E; 's take precedence.
6.2 "Soft-Coding" Assumptions A problem with "evidential" reasoning schemes is that the conditional independence assumptions of the E; 's given H and given -.H are often too strong: there are so many such assumptions that they are inconsistent either with each other, or with given (hard) information about the probability of H given conjunctions of various E;'s. We observe that MCI can be used to make such assumptions by default. Past approaches have been to "hard-code" or "build" such assumptions into the probabilistic inference ma chinery in a way which is monotonic and thus fre quently inconsistent. "Soft-coding" via defeasibility retains the advantages (conceptual simplicity, repre sentational parsimony, and computational ea8e) af forded by making the assumptions, to the greatest extent possible without sacrificing consistency and express iveness. We can regard this as maximizing, rather than inflexibly ass uming, a sort of "modular ity" or "locality". Another issue in evidential reasoning is that often P( E; IS) is uncertain rather than certain. In such cases, commonly (e.g. in PROSPECTOR [7) ) the assumption is made that for each of several EJ�c representing most specific conjunctive formulae in the E; 's and their negations:
GIG( {H, S}, EJ�c)
Of course this ass umption may be inconsistent with other hard information. In particular, the presump tion that it is consistent in practice seems to have been made by implicitly limiting what sorts of prob abilistic information will be present, i.e. can be ex pressed, in the AI system making this ass umption [8] .
If we "soft-code" this ass umption as a "default inher itance" step, then we can avoid the choice between expressive limitation and inconsistency.
7 Graphoids, Influence Diagrams, and Irrelevance
Recently both the AI and the Decision Analysis re search communities have developed interest in the idea of reasoning about the structure of ( condi tional) dependencies and independencies among a complexly-related collection of probabilistic events, in a fashion abstracted from the details of the particular underlying probabilistic values It appears that espe cially for humans it is a natural and helpful way to factor probabilistic reasoning. This makes it impor tant for explanation, justification, and validation of probabilistic reasoning, and suggests that there may be computational advantages as well. One direction of this research is represented by influence diagrams [6] . Influence diagrams implic itly specify conditional independencies by omission of "links" representing conditional probability state ments (constraints). This suggests the use of a non monotonic specification convention for influence di agrams: a sort of "closed dependency" assumption analogous to the "closed world assumption" familiar in categorical reasoning.
A related direction of research is the alternative formulation of conditional independence provided by the abstraction of Graphoids [16] 4• A Graphoid is the theory of a trinary relation, I(x, z, y), which we can take to denote GIG( {x, y}, z), but with the additional generality that x, y, and z denote (non intersecting) sets of propositions. Informally, denotes J\ I({a;},{ck},{bj})
i,j,lc
; and I( {at}, { cl:}, {b j }) denotes GIG( {a;, bi }, Ck).
As with influence diagrams, we can imagine em ploying non-monotonic reasoning about Graphoids, e.g. as a specification convention. MCI in terms of Graphoids is the maximization of the I relation. Thus given partial constraints on the relation I, we might non-monotonically conclude additional positive literals in I.
Another way to think about conditional (in)dependence is in terms of (ir)relevance. GIG({x,y},z) means that given z, learning y is irrelevant to our estimate of the probability of x; and vice versa, that given z, learning x is irrelevant to our estimate of the probability of y. MCI then corresponds to the non-monotonic maximization of irrelevance. This has a flavor of maximizing simplicity in the sense of Occam's Razor. The more that we can decide is irrelevant to some problem-soving task, the easier that task becomes; thus maximization of irrelevance holds out the ul timate promise of substantial computational advan tages if that maximization itself is not too complex.
A Circumscriptive Formalization of (SP)MCI
We can try to formalize MCI in a variety of formalisms for non-monotonic reasoning, e.g. Cir cumscription [12, 13] , Default Logic (17] , or Non Monotonic Modal Logic (14] . However, we also want to express the precedence of more specific information in the sense discussed earlier. For this purpose, a recently-developed version of Circumscription, called Pointwise Circumscription [11] , is most apt. In it, we can conveniently express priorities among the var ious defaults corresponding to particular conditional independence statements. We lack space to go into the details here of circumscription and its pointwise version.
The following treatment is necessarily rather schematic. 4 
Below we follow their notation
Circumscription accomplishes non-monotonic rea soning from a base theory B by applying the (mono tonic) theory-closure of class ical second-order logic to B augmented by an additional second-order cir cumscription axiom which is formed from B accord ing to a circumscription policy specifying the non monotonic behavior. The circumscription axiom ex presses the minimality of a predicate.
We now sketch a proposed method to construct an appropriate B and policy to accomplish (SP)MCI. We are currently investigating a number of unresolved outstanding technical issues involved in proving that the following indeed accomplishes its intended effect.
Let 8o (e.g. {A) U LOGb U AXPROB}) be our "base" theory consisting of given, monotonic (hard), probabilistic axioms (both certain and uncertain), e.g. P(G2-C 1 ) = 1 ; P(HIG 1 ) = .15 ; etc .. 8o is in a first-order language .Cm.
In terms of pointwise circumscription, we can ex press MCI via the circumscription, i.e. minimization, of an introduced abnormality predicate AB charac terized by the following axiom which we add to 8o to form 8. (By employing a slight variant of circum scription, which we dub "hyperscription", in which predicates are maximized rather than minimized, we can actually avoid the need to introduce an AB and the following axiom. We just maximize GIG directly. However the following formulation will be easier for most readers to follow.)
-.AB( {x, y}, z)=?GIG( {x, y}, z)
We can express MCI via a pointwise circumscription axiom (11] :
This says that AB is minimized in the theory 8, with the predicates AB and GIG and the function P being variable respectively when (the newly-introduced predicates) VAB, Vera, and Vp hold.
Two interesting sorts of questions about MCI are: which tuples ({x,y},z} to try to presume by default; and with what priorities. Pointwise circumscription gives us a way to specify these in some detail. We can express via VAB both the delimitation of the scope of MCI, and the priorities among various conditional independence (CI) defaults.
VAB(({u,v},w},({r,s},t)) means that when min imizing AB (i.e. maximizing GIG) at tuple ( { u, v}, w}, the tuple ( { r, s}, t} is variable. To specify VAB ( { {a, b}, c), { {a, b}, c))
If (8) is absent from Th2(B), e.g. if its negation is present, then MCI will not apply to that tuple.
To specify that the CI default on tuple ({a,b},c) has greater priority than the CI default on tuple ({ d,e} , / } , we include in B the axiom:
Thus we can write a general Specificity-Prioritization Axiom:
vc1, c2.(P(C2-c1) = 1):::: :?
(Vx, y.VAB( ({x, y}, C2), ({x, y}, Ct) ))
We can imagine specifying other kinds of prioriti zations among CI defaults as well. We may wish to infer some CI defaults before considering others. We can do so by making the former have higher priority, i.e. be relatively "harder".
Thus in pointwise circumscription we can5 express Maximization of Conditional Independence with and without Specificity-Prioritization ((SP)MCI), re stricted to arbitrary collections of tuples. and with arbitrary priorities among the CI defaults.
Maximum Entropy
So far we have discussed two major types of non-monotonic probabilistic reasoning:
"default inheritance" (formulable as SPMCI) and default locality /irrelevance/ larapho i d (formulable as MCI). A third type of non-monotonic probabilistic reasoning is the use of the Maximum Entropy assumption, which has attracted considerable attention in the AI community (e.g. [9, 7, 1, 15, 3] ) Maximum Entropy (ME) is a method of selecting a non-monotonic extension of given ("base") hard axioms B. The base axioms are treated as a set of constraints on the maximization of the entropy of the joint probability distribution P(F):
-L P(F;)log(P(F;)) F;E:F ME always produces a unique, complete extension. By "complete", we mean that every P(W;IWi) has a unique single real value in the ME extension: the lower conditional probability distribution on W is equal to the upper probability distribution.
see the caveat above
Intuitively, ME tries to "fl atten" the joint distribu tion P(:F). In the extremal case, i.e. if the base theory is empty, then the result of ME is that each P(F;) is the same as every other. This is sometimes called the uniform prior, or LaPlacian prior, assumption. ME often non-monotonically entails a large number of conditional independence statements.
It has some elegant properties in this regard. A well known result [10] is the Product Extension Theorem, which partially characterizes the sorts of conditional independence statements produced by ME, in terms of propositional subspaces.
A natural question is the relationship between ME and (SP)MCI.
Clearly they are not in general identical. Consider the case of an empty base theory.
Here ME entails a uniform distribution, while (SP)MCI entails only conditional independence constraints which are satisfiable by non-uniform distributions. Also, in general (SP)MCI does not entail a unique, complete extension: e.g. it may result in bounds on, rather than point values for, some probabilities.
An interesting open question we are investigating is how fully to characterize the sort of conditional independence statements produced by ME, including in relation to specificity-prioritization.
10 Discussion (SP)MCI appears to represent several important kinds of non-monotonicity in probabilistic reasoning. SPMCI can express the commonly-found "default inheritance" principle. We can use MCI as a spec ification convention for Graphoids or infl uence dia grams. We can use MCI to maximize irrelevance in a particular sense. MCI also promises to provide a tool to specify the presumption of "locality" of updating in the sense of "evidential" reasoning. MCI overlaps substantially with Maximization of Entropy (ME). Compared to ME, it is a more precisely controllable ass umption. It separates the assumption of maxi mizing conditional independence from the uniform prior ass umption; ME conflates the two. SPMCI can yield a non-monotonic theory with bounds, not just point values, for probabilities. Moreover, we can specify in much greater detail the tuples to which to. apply MCI and SP. Hopefully that this will carry over to more control and goal-directedness in com putation as well. Current ME algorithms are global, numerical relaxation procedures which calculate the entire joint probability distribution. It is thus often impracticably costly to apply the ME ass umption. An open challenge is to make any of these three types of non-monotonic probabilistic reasoning reasonably efficient. One important criterion we might want to impose is that the non-monotonic conclusions about GIG be definite.
As usual with non-monotonic reasoning, there are at least two sorts of intepretations or justifications for adopting a non-monotonic theory-closure prin ciple. One is as a representational or specification convention. Another is as a conjectural decision rule. Due to lack of space, we have concentrated here more on the form rather than on the pragmatic substance of non-monotonicity in probabilistic reasoning. One interesting lead we are investigating is the basis in Bayesian statistical estimation and decision theory for what we have called the "default inheritance" principle.
Conclusion
Probabilistic Logic casts monotonic probabilistic rea soning in terms of monotonic categorical reasoning with probabilistic statements. We extended this approach, and cast non-monotonic probabilistic rea soning in terms of non-monotonic categorical reason ing. We identified a type of non-monotonic prob abilistic reasoning, akin to default inheritance in categorical reasoning, that seems to be commonly found in practice. We formulated this as a principle: Specificity-Prioritized Maximization of Conditional Independence (SPMCI). We then identified another interesting type of non-monotonic probabilistic rea soning, akin to default irrelevancy, and showed that it can be formulated and formalized in similar terms: as Maximization of Conditional Independence (MCI). We formalized (SP)MCI using Pointwise Circum scription, a recently developed variant of the circum scription formalism for (categorical) non-monotonic reasoning. We noted the Maximum Entropy ass ump tion as a third type of non-monotonic probabilistic reasoning, and compared it to (SP)MCI.
Directions for Future Research
The main intent of this paper is to help to define and provoke an area of investigation. We have offered more conjectures and suggestions than answers.
Several open questions about (SP)MCI were men tioned in passing. When, i.e. for which tuples, do we want to do MCI? Are there additional sorts of prior itizations besides SP which are desirable or useful? (Our preliminary investigations indicate that it is often undesirable to perform indiscriminate MCI, and that prioritization beyond specificity is sometimes de sirable.) When and to what extent does MEr :uce MCI? Insofar as ME produces MCI, is it compatible with SP? Are there ways to employ (SP)MCI in relatively efficiently in goal-directed computations, RF.FF.RF.Nr.F.� i.e. without computing the entire lower probability distribution non-monotonically entailed by SPMCI? Does our proposed circumscriptive formalization of (SP)MCI have its intended models?
